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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we discuss different models for human logic
systems and describe a game with nature. Go¨del‘s incom-
pleteness theorem is taken into account to construct a model
of logical networks based on axioms obtained by symmetry
breaking. These classical logic networks are then coupled
using rules that depend on whether two networks contain
axioms or anti-axioms. The social lattice of axiom based
logic networks is then placed with the environment network
in a game including entropy as a cost factor. The classical
logical networks are then replaced with “preference axioms”
to explore the role of fuzzy logic.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [ Social and behavioral sciences]: Economics
Keywords
complexity, logic, entropy, spin glass
1. INTRODUCTION
In this preliminary paper, we discuss the possibilities of
interactions between logic systems in complex agents placed
in a social network and between individual agents and na-
ture. We examine the effect of uncertainty in measurements
by a neural network. First we consider a classical network
with a fixed group of axioms. We discuss a quantum neu-
ral network that has no fixed axioms, but the probability of
using an axiom or its contradiction with certain probability-
coefficients in each “decision making measurement”. Then
we investigate the interactions among these logic networks
in a social lattice, and later in a game with nature. We de-
scribe the role of entropy in the game with nature, and in
interactions with other agents.
2. REVIEW OF SYMMETRY BREAKING,
ENTROPY AND THE DIRECTION OF
TIME
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Entropy was created in nature with symmetry breaking.
As the ten-dimensional expanding universe stopped growing
in certain dimensions, momentons trapped in the stopped di-
mensions gave rise to particles in order for their momentum
modes to fit within those defined dimension lengths. En-
tropy was thus created. The second law of thermodynamics
states that entropy in a closed system must always increase,
attributing to the fact that nature would detest particles
clumping together by means of the gravitational force. The
gravitational force, on the other hand, is described as the
coupling between time and the spatial dimensions, and as
the universe expands, the gravitational coupling becomes
weaker and weaker, giving rise to increased entropy.
Hence time would become decoupled from space when en-
tropy reaches its maximum.
2.1 Information and Entropy
Information may be described as a constraint in nature
obtained by symmetry breaking [1]. An increase in infor-
mation would increase the complexity of the system or an
observer in the system because more pieces of information
can give rise to more and more laws in which the nature may
evolve.
2.2 Agents and Information
When an agent obtains a piece of information from nature,
it does so by breaking a symmetry. This information gets
transformed into an axiom in the agents cognitive network.
An increase in the amount of information and hence the
number of axioms will imply the possibility of more options
by which the agent is able to make a decision by combining
the axioms with rules.
2.3 Agents as Complex Entities
An agent may be described as a complex meta-stable sys-
tem that acquires information by interacting with nature.
We propose that agents are connected in social lattices. It
is possible to have clusters of social lattices that may later
be put into contact with one another. An agent can process
any information stored in its cognitive network. Every agent
may interact with nature macroscopically. This interaction
can be in the form of restructuring the agents environment.
Again, any reconstruction of the environment will imply an
increase in entropy in nature.
2.4 Definitions of Networks
A classical logic network is a network that is based on a
fixed set of axioms. The axioms are connected with classi-
cal gates or rules. So given an input, the network uses the
axioms and rules to produce an output or a decision. All
the axioms and the gates in this model are fixed. We can vi-
sualize the scenario by imagining a register representing an
axiom. The register holds a value of either 1 or -1 depending
on whether the register contains an axiom or the contradic-
tion of an axiom, which we shall refer to as an anti-axiom
from now on.
A decision of the network consists of an “action” which
may be an interaction with “nature” at a macroscopic level,
an interaction with another logic network or an update of a
coefficient with which the network is connected to another
network (this will be discussed in detail later).
In the quantum version of the network, each register is
replaced with two registers that contain the coefficients for
the axiom and the anti-axiom, a and b, such that |a|2 +
|b|2 = 1. However, an agents final decisions are based on a
classical logical semantics where classically defined axioms
are connected by rules to produce an output; so that we have
a group (A = a1, a2....an, R = r1, r2....rn)⇒ D = decision.
During each decision making process, depending on the
coefficients, the (axiom + anti-axiom) function collapses to
only one of the states, taking the coefficients into account.
This type of network would represent a model where a per-
son has a preference, but in different circumstances may
choose differently, perhaps based on the other inputs and
using rules concerning inputs and coefficients. The improb-
ability of quantum collapse in the human brain has been
explored [6]. So we substitute the “conscious” brain net-
work with a model where we introduce “hidden variables.”
In this model, a previous decision or an environmental factor
triggers the choice of an axiom over an anti-axiom or vice
versa by using the coefficient values stored in the twin reg-
isters. A detailed model of a hidden variable driven collapse
is being developed.
2.5 The Classical Logic System and Incom-
pleteness
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem states that any classical
logic system must be incomplete [2]. Classical systems of
logic are based on axioms, and the axioms themselves cannot
be proven within the logic system.
Now for any axiom in a logic system, we can define an
axiom that contradicts it; namely, for C, we can define
NOT(C). Now a classical logical system may not have both
C and NOT(C) as underlying axioms, as in that case the
system will run into inconsistencies when all the axioms are
gated. In other words, there may be no such condition as C
AND (NOT(C)). So the logical system chooses either C or
NOT(C) as an axiom, and excludes its counterpart.
Now we try to define how quantum uncertainties and sym-
metry breaking can give rise to logic systems that may be
contradictory, or in other words, logical systems that con-
tain contradictory axioms. We propose that nature itself is
initially apathetic to C or NOT(C), or simply, nature does
not prefer C or NOT(C). So we start from a logic vacuum,
or a space where for every axiom there is a coexisting anti-
axiom. In order to choose which of these clauses should
be picked as the underlying axiom, we resort to symmetry
breaking. We define states which are mixtures of orthonor-
mal axioms in the same manner we have mixed states in
quantum mechanics.
2.6 Deriving Classical Logic Systems by Sym-
metry Breaking
It is possible to imagine a wave function of “axioms” that
may be “collapsed” by some measurement. The mode for
this “measurement” may be what Roger Penrose describes
as “consciousness” [3]. More likely, it is an agents interac-
tion with nature that defines the rules, or etches the axioms
into the neural network. So instead of a “decision space”, we
actually go back to a wave particle duality space that estab-
lishes “preferences” in the neural network. In other words,
we can say that an agents perception organs acquire these
axioms from nature by means of symmetry breaking. Again,
each time a measurement is made, a symmetry is broken in
the axiom space, so the axiom space is fixed inside a neural
network. However, this can be achieved only by disturbing
the macro nature, or by increasing entropy in nature. So
the axiom space becomes more defined by disturbing the
macroscopic nature entropy. We assume that this process of
symmetry breaking and acquisition of information is local
to the agent and its environment.
3. CLASSICAL LOGIC NETWORKS PLACED
IN A SOCIAL LATTICE
Now we connect the logic networks in a model akin to the
spin model [5]. Here, we can draw similarities with thermo-
dynamics where a micro system (in this case the perceptory
organs - coupled to the neural network) is placed in con-
junction with a macro system (which is the environment).
These logic networks placed in a society may be visualized
as a small thermodynamic spin lattice where the axioms re-
siding in different networks are coupled to one another by
coupling constants Jij , and the lattice itself is coupled to a
bigger lattice, which is the environment.
However, since we can define the environment lattice to be
huge compared to the neural network lattice, we can proba-
bly take average values for interaction purposes and couple
the lattice with the neural network lattice with some multi-
dimensional coupling factor.
In each of the lattices, spins are at a quantum level de-
scribed as “states” which can coexist in many orthonormal
superpositions. However, when the smaller lattice interacts
with the bigger lattice, the coupling causes the environ-
ment lattice to collapse to a certain value. This value will
depend on the probabilistic coefficients of the wave func-
tions and most of the time it would yield the expected
value. So an average person will end up with an average
set of axioms. Now each of the agents has a certain set
of axioms to start with. Again, these agents are coupled
with one another in a lattice. A similar model with spin
glass models and evolution has been suggested at < http :
//pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SPINGL.html >. However, we argue
that the agents are not connected with one another with a
random coupling constant, Jij , but some rules are defined,
and also that these Jijs are updatable according to the spe-
cific state of the entire network.
1. Jij is not symmetric, i.e., Jij 6= Jji. The value of Jij de-
pends on i possessing axioms that necessitate the existence
of j. So i will be coupled to j more strongly if i possesses
axioms that require the existence of j.
Now each agent will have the following behaviors in the
game:
1. Each agent i will tend to flip its neighbors axioms if
the neighbors axioms contain contradictions of is axioms.
The frequency and strength of flipping would depend on a
coupling constant Cij .
Cij depends on the following:
a. The evolution of the logical code developed in i that
contains that particular axiom, i.e. the networking of the
certain axiom in the logic network of i. More accurately, the
number of decisions produced by i that reflect the use of the
particular axiom. In other words, i will tend to flip a neigh-
bors anti-axiom with more effort if the axiom has become
an important part of its network, and any future attempt of
js flipping it would cost i dearly.
b. The determination of the number of the contradictory
axiom in the neighboring agents logic network. An increased
frequency of anti-axioms in is network would increase the
possibility of an anti-axiom to be used in a future decision.
c. The effect of js decision in is environment (might be
caused by physical distance between the two agents)
Now the total strength of coupling between i and j (i →
j) would be - Jnij (stateni → statenj) + C
m
ij (statemi →
statemj),
where n and m are states or registers representing axioms.
We can implement this scheme by linking two agents with
appropriate gates. The value of this coupling could be de-
scribed as feelings of agent i towards agent j. This total
coupling will, at a macroscopic level, cause i to play for or
against j, i.e. collaborate with j or work against the exis-
tence of j.
2. An axiom will flip if the effect of the neighbors same
axiom state coupling exceeds a flipping energy. The flipping
energy depends on:
The certain axioms connectivity with other axioms in the
agents cognitive network.
3. All agents must possess an axiom we shall call self
preservation or preservation of the network in random prob-
ability. We label this axiom P . Agents containing neither of
these axioms cannot contribute to the existence of the agent
or to the network. In that case those agents axioms, if few,
will be flipped by other agents; or they will self-destroy. A
later paper will discuss the effect of agents possessing de-
structive axioms in their cognitive network, or any critical
number that will bound the fraction of agents with self de-
structive axioms in a network. However, in this paper, we
assume that all agents possess P .
4. COMPLEXITY VERSUS ENTROPY
An agent will try to increase its own or the networks com-
plexity and hence stability by the acquired axioms as soon as
the acquired axioms get connected to the existence axiom,
E.. The agents cognitive complexity increases as it acquires
more and more information from nature. This complexity
provides the agent with more and more options to create a
decision, and hence, increase the entropy of nature.
5. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AGENTS AND
NATURE: THE COST FACTOR
Now each social lattice again is coupled to nature, and
we can assume the following game being played: The self
preservation clause makes an agent play against nature to
preserve its own stability while nature tends to increase dis-
order. As disorder increases, so does entropy. The agents
play by acquiring information from nature. Axioms added to
an agents logical structure contribute to its networks com-
plexity. These new acquired axioms again get entangled
with the basic self preservation axiom. This incidence adds
more points to the self-preservation side of the game, as now
the agents have more rules they can use to preserve them-
selves.
Now we propose a game with the following rules:
Each agent has an axiom called self preservation or preser-
vation of network chosen at random. We call this axiom the
preservation axiom or P .
The other axioms are acquired by interaction with nature.
Acquiring each axiom has a cost factor C, since the pro-
cess requires measurements that increase entropy of the sys-
tem. The increase of entropy disturbs the meta-stable agent
state. The acquired axioms get gated with the preservation
axiom and add points to further stabilize the agent. The ac-
quired axioms in different agents are again connected. The
contradictory agents are connected repulsively and the sup-
porting axioms attractively.
This game is now being simulated using different values
for the couplings constants and the costs. In an earlier work
we have presented simulations for a very simple network
where agents are connected to neighbors with unitary gates
and are allowed to flip when the effects from the neighbors
cross a threshold [4].
We add an extra dissipation term with each flip that is lin-
ear in entropy, and also a coefficient term with each CNOT
gate now chosen at random. In this very simple model, the
spins form a closed social network, and we are ignoring the
acquisition of new axioms from nature.
6. THE DECISIONS
An agent would use a subset of the axioms and rules to
produce a decision. The decision might be a macroscopic
interaction with the environment. This may lead to restruc-
turing the environment. A restructuring event consists of
breaking an organized structure and creating a new one.
This action increases the entropy and decreases the total
free energy of the system as
F = H − TS.
Now the interaction might reflect the presence of an axiom
by breaking a symmetry in the environment and might shift
the expectation value of the axiom from < A > to < A1 >.
This implies that another agent seeking an axiom will now
have a higher probability of obtaining A instead of A¯ (Here,
by A and A¯ we mean axiom and anti-axiom). In such a case,
an agent possessing A¯ will incur a cost factor because
1. Acquiring A¯ has cost the agent.
2. A¯ might have become connected with its preservation
axiom.
The agent possessing A has two options now:
a. Inverting A¯ to A
b. Trying to convert agents holding A
Whether an agent will choose strategy a) or b) will depend
on the entropy cost.
7. THE PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING AN
AXIOM BY ANOTHER AGENT
The probability of obtaining an axiom or an anti-axiom
by another agent can now be written down in a simplified
version by the formula:
F (A) =∑
CijAf1(flip)−
∑
JijAf2(stabilize)−f3(1/R)+K < A >
Here, A is the axiom, R is a resistance factor for flipping
the axiom depending on how entangled the axiom is in the
agents own cognitive network, K is the coupling of the agent
with nature, and < A > is the expectation probability of
the axiom in nature. We can see that this formula is very
similar to the formula for a classical neural network, except
that the coupling constants, unlike the weight factors in a
regular neural network, do not sum up to 1. Also, instead
of adding a term in < A >, it might be more realistic to add
a term F (< A >). Here F (A) is a switching function that
takes on a value of either -1 or 1, depending on whether the
RHS exceeds a certain threshold. So every time A or A¯ flips,
the Cs and the Js are interchanged, and R is updated to a
new value that needs to be updated with the accumulation
of new axioms that get entangled with the flipped clause.
A cost of entropy term must be added depending on whether
the agent has the take entropy into account axiom or the ig-
nore entropy axiom in its network.
8. TRADING AXIOMS
Communicating axioms can be described as a method for
obtaining these by several agents at a lower entropy cost
than would be necessary in an unsocial (single uncoupled
spin) case. The agent obtaining the axiom makes a decision
and interacts with its environment macroscopically so that it
changes nature to have the information available at a lower
entropy cost by other agents.
This can be achieved only when a group of agents have
a shared group of rules that relate symbols with possible
axioms.
9. INTRODUCING FUZZY AXIOMS
A rigid axiom network in each agent will produce a sys-
tem where too many conflicts are present. We now define
a system where the axioms are fuzzy. These fuzzy axioms
may be described as preferences.
However, even in this system we initially keep the preser-
vation axiom, P , non fuzzy or stable. The reason for this
formulation is as follows: A probabilistic P will cut the life-
time of the agent, as every collapsed lack of intention to exist
decision will work against the existence of the agent. Later
in a follow-up paper, we will present a simulation where we
see the effect of non-discretizing P .
So now we have a network with one register holding a
value of 1 for P , and qubits that represent the superposition
of both the axiom and the anti-axioms with coefficients a
and be such that |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 for other axioms.
Now, in a logic system where we have one non-fuzzy axiom
coexisting with fuzzy axioms, the gates must be designed so
that no decision or input can modify the non-fuzzy axiom
P . Hence all the other axioms may be connected in the logic
network in a way such that the acquired fuzzy axioms and
the decisions or interactions with other agents may modify
the preferences or the coefficients stored in the qubits, but
P stays connected to all other axioms in a way such that no
axiom can modify it. The connection path with P must be
one way.
Problems in this scheme arise when two agents are cou-
pled, where the coupling constants between the axiom lat-
tices may tend to modify P for an agent as both agents try
to independently fulfill their axioms keeping only their own
P constant.
9.1 Fuzzying the Existence Axiom
In reality, an agent will interact with other agents, who
will not exist forever. So the non-fuzzy I exist” axiom will
be coupled with the information that agents die. However,
a flip in the I exist axiom as an effect of adding this new
piece of information would destabilize the agents cognitive
network as any decisions contrary to existence would be self-
destructive.
9.2 The Spurious Supporting Axioms
An agent possessing P in combination with the logical
clause: “I am an agent and agents die” will be more suc-
cessful in self-preservation if it can neutralize or alleviate the
effect of the latter clause by adding spurious axioms which
would contribute a positive factor to P in order to stabilize
it. The other possibility may be living in the present, i.e.,
ignoring the cost factor of increased entropy and the future.
9.3 Conflicting Spurious Axioms
The spurious axioms that would support the “I exist” ax-
iom must be non fuzzy, as fuzzy spurious axioms cannot
always lead to the same result, and may contribute nega-
tively to the I exist axiom at times. So for the most efficient
stabilization of P , the designed spurious axioms must be non
fuzzy. However, these spurious axioms must be acquired in a
fuzzy universe, and may become also be coupled with fuzzy
axioms. So agents may again possess a conflicting set of
spurious axioms.
9.4 The Spurious Axiom Game
The spurious axioms game may be modelled as follows
1. An agent will believe that the spurious axioms are true,
and no contradiction may exist.
2. Agents containing a set of spurious axioms conflicting
another agents spurious axioms will try to flip the second
agents spurious axioms.
3. If flipping is impossible, an agent may try to destroy
another agent containing a conflicting spurious axiom as the
existence of any conflicting axiom may contradict the agents
self existence axiom by coupling.
4. Another strategy would be to keep the spurious axioms
private, without showing them to another agent.
9.5 Trading Spurious Axioms
An agent unable to maintain a stock of spurious axioms
that do not conflict with any other axioms in its cognitive
network may buy a spurious axiom from another agent.
The trade may consist of an axiom in exchange of a deci-
sion or action by the buying agent. The decision would cost
work from the agent, and hence the agent will lose time and
increase the entropy of its own local environment. Agents
selling spurious axioms will seek to maximize their gain by
selling the axioms to as many agents as possible.
9.6 Hiding Spurious Axioms
An agent satisfied with its spurious axiom may hide it, as
an open debate might render inconsistencies in it, and hence
oblige the agent to buy spurious axioms.
10. THE IGNORE ENTROPY AXIOM
Any rule that would ignore the effect of future and en-
tropy would ignore the cost factor in acquiring information,
and would make an agent maximize the acquisition of infor-
mation from nature taking only the increasing complexity
factor of the agent into account, and not at the increasing
entropy factor of the entire environment. However, the in-
creased entropy of the entire environment again would affect
all agents, including those who take the cost factor into ac-
count. Since ignore the future agents would destabilize the
agents who take entropy into account, a conflict would arise.
11. THE GAME OF IGNORE ENTROPY AND
A SPURIOUS AXIOM
An agent may play a game by superposing the ignore en-
tropy axiom with a spurious axiom. This may reduce con-
flicts among spurious axioms. We try to formulate the pos-
sible games here and compare.
Agent 1: S1
Agent 2: S2
Agent 3: I
Agent 4: a S1 + b I
Agent 5: c S2 + d I
Agent 6: sell S3 but believe in S4
Agent 7: confused; no axiom
Here S1, S2 and S3 are spurious axiom 1, spurious axiom
2 and spurious axiom 3; I is ignore entropy; and a, b, c and
d are coefficients such that in any one superposed wave, the
sum of the squares of the coefficients is 1. Also, S1, S2 and
S3 are normal to one another. I introduces an extra cost
factor K(A) to other agents with every action made by an
agent holding I . Also, Agent 6 makes a profit of K2 by
selling S3 to an agent. K2 is a function of the macroscopic
work saved by agent 6. However, Agent 6 must make an
investment, K4, which is a function of the work required to
convert the agent. This work might consist of mapping S1
and S2 finding inconsistencies in them.
Now Agent 1 and Agent 2 have two possibilities:
a. Hide axiom
b. Show axiom
Besides holding S1 and S2, Agents 1 and 2 have two other
options:
a. Sell axiom
b. Optimize on other axioms.
However, in order to sell axiom, agents 1 and 2 must show
axiom. So sell axiom must be gated with show axiom with
an AND. Now if 1 and 2 optimize on other axioms, they can
either show axiom or sell axiom. If they show axiom, 6 will
now have its cost function reduced, as 6 now only needs to
find an anti axiom to substitute into 1 and 2’s axioms. If 1
and 2 hide axioms, then 6 will have to
a) Find 1 and 2’s axioms, and
b) Find an anti-axiom.
Now if 1 and 2 decide to show axiom and sell axiom then
1 and 2 will both try to flip each other and 6 will try to flip
both 1 and 2. Given that 1 or 2 is able to flip the other
and trade axioms, 1 or 2 will profit only when profit made
from the other surpasses the effort put into conversion. Now
assuming that 1 and 2 both have the same working ability,
1 or 2 will profit only when they have to spend less than
half the remaining lifetime of the other trying to flip the
other. Now calculating the cost factor and the success of
conversion can get very complex, and will be discussed in a
later paper.
Now agent 6 will have a strategy to find S1 and S2 prop-
erly and design incoherence in them. However, this strategy
will succeed depending on being successful achieving the fol-
lowing:
a. Finding a subgroup of axioms in S3 which agents 1 or 2
may find more indispensable than S1 or S2 and which con-
flicts with a subset of S1 or S2.
b. Convincing agents 1 and 2 that S3 has no logical flaws,
based on the other axioms perceived by 1 and 2.
c. Not assimilating S3 into S4 and creating inconsistencies
its own logical network.
Now any inconsistencies in S3 and the observation of S4
by agent 1 or 2 will lead to disbelief in agent 6. And since
S1 and S2 are connected to existence axioms of agents 1 and
2, inconsistencies between S3 and S4 observed by agents 1
or 2 will add a huge cost factor K to agent 6.
A more detailed simulation of the game is now on the way.
12. CONCLUSION
In this preliminary paper we merely suggest some mod-
elling possibilities for development of logical systems when
human beings interact. More detailed studies are being car-
ried out.
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